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Catrin
Campbell-Moore

Lecturer in Philosophy

University of Bristol

About me

I work on logic and formal epistemology, and often on the connection between these. Much of my work centres on epistemic versions of the liar paradox in the form of cases where one’s credences undermine themselves. I also work on accuracy theory and alternative models of belief.

Interests

  • Non-classical Logic
  • Probability
  • Liar paradox
  • Epistemic Rationality
  • Accuracy

Employment and Education

Research

My current projects…

Undermining Beliefs and Imprecise Probabilities

This studies epistemic versions of the liar paradox and suggests imprecise probabilities are rationally required in such cases.

Accuracy

How do accuracy-considerations apply in settings such as risk-aware decision theories, non-classical logic, imprecise probabilities?

Recent Publications

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Forthcoming with Bernhard Salow

Accurate Updating for the Risk-Sensitive

We argue that accuracy-theoretic considerations still tell the risk-sensitive to update by conditionalization.

Preprint DOI
Analysis Forthcoming with Ben Levinstein

Strict Propriety is Weak

We note that strict propriety follows from weak propriety, given truth-directedness, thus closing an argumentative gap in the literature.

Preprint DOI
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2020 with Bernhard Salow

Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence

This argues that evidence gathering is epistemically irrational for the (Buchak-style) risk-avoidant agent. To do this we consider how accuracy should be measured once risk-awareness is rationally permissible.

Preprint DOI
Analysis Reviews 2019 with Jason Konek

Believing Probabilistic Contents

We show that Moss’s model of uncertainty is at least as expressively powerful as every other current imprecise probability framework. And we give a Dutch Book argument for certain failures of consistency.

Preprint DOI
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