Lecturer in Philosophy

University of Bristol

About me

I work on logic and formal epistemology, and often on the connection between these. Much of my work centres on epistemic versions of the liar paradox in the form of cases where one’s credences undermine themselves. I also work on accuracy theory and alternative models of belief.


  • Non-classical Logic
  • Probability
  • Liar paradox
  • Epistemic Rationality
  • Accuracy

Employment and Education


My current projects…

Undermining Beliefs and Imprecise Probabilities

This studies epistemic versions of the liar paradox and suggests imprecise probabilities are rationally required in such cases.


How do accuracy-considerations apply in settings such as risk-aware decision theories, non-classical logic, imprecise probabilities?

Recent Publications

Accurate Updating for the Risk-Sensitive

We argue that accuracy-theoretic considerations still tell the risk-sensitive to update by conditionalization.

Strict Propriety is Weak

We note that strict propriety follows from weak propriety, given truth-directedness, thus closing an argumentative gap in the literature.

Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence

This argues that evidence gathering is epistemically irrational for the (Buchak-style) risk-avoidant agent. To do this we consider how accuracy should be measured once risk-awareness is rationally permissible.

Believing Probabilistic Contents

We show that Moss’s model of uncertainty is at least as expressively powerful as every other current imprecise probability framework. And we give a Dutch Book argument for certain failures of consistency.