I work on logic and formal epistemology, and often on the connection between these. Much of my work centres on epistemic versions of the liar paradox in the form of cases where one’s credences undermine themselves. I also work on accuracy theory and alternative models of belief.
Lecturer in Philosophy
Stipendary Research Fellow
Dr.Phil. (PhD) in Philosophy
Master in Mathematics and Philosophy
My current projects…
We argue that accuracy-theoretic considerations still tell the risk-sensitive to update by conditionalization.
We note that strict propriety follows from weak propriety, given truth-directedness, thus closing an argumentative gap in the literature.
This argues that evidence gathering is epistemically irrational for the (Buchak-style) risk-avoidant agent. To do this we consider how accuracy should be measured once risk-awareness is rationally permissible.
We show that Moss’s model of uncertainty is at least as expressively powerful as every other current imprecise probability framework. And we give a Dutch Book argument for certain failures of consistency.