I work on formal epistemology and logic, and often on the connection between these.
I have a particular interest in credal versions of the liar paradox. My PhD primarily worked on modifying accounts of the liar to deal with probabilities. I am now considering whether these accounts can help us understand epistemic rationality in these cases.
I have a broader interest in thinking about epistemic rationality when we reject some of the underlying assumptions, for example, when the logic is non-classical, the decision theory is risk-sensitive, or where the model of belief is relaxed, such as allowing for imprecise probabilities.
Lecturer in Philosophy
Stipendary Research Fellow
Dr.Phil. (PhD) in Philosophy
Master in Mathematics and Philosophy
My current projects…
We argue that accuracy-theoretic considerations still tell the risk-sensitive to update by conditionalization.
We note that strict propriety follows from weak propriety, given truth-directedness, thus closing an argumentative gap in the literature.
This argues that evidence gathering is epistemically irrational for the (Buchak-style) risk-avoidant agent. To do this we consider how accuracy should be measured once risk-awareness is rationally permissible.
We show that Moss’s model of uncertainty is at least as expressively powerful as every other current imprecise probability framework. And we give a Dutch Book argument for certain failures of consistency.