I work on formal epistemology and logic, and often on the connection between these.

I have a particular interest in credal versions of the liar paradox. My PhD primarily worked on modifying accounts of the liar to deal with probabilities. I am now considering whether these accounts can help us understand epistemic rationality in these cases.

I have a broader interest in thinking about epistemic rationality when we reject some of the underlying assumptions, for example, when the logic is non-classical, the decision theory is risk-sensitive, or where the model of belief is relaxed, such as allowing for imprecise probabilities.

- Accuracy
- Models of degreed belief
- Non-classical Logic
- Imprecise probability
- Liar paradox

Lecturer in Philosophy

Stipendary Research Fellow

Dr.Phil. (PhD) in Philosophy

Master in Mathematics and Philosophy

We investigate the supervaluational Kripkean account of truth and show how it can apply to finding rational indeterminate credences in undermining scenarios. Our construction is general and could apply to a whole range of domains.

We argue that accuracy-theoretic considerations still tell the risk-sensitive to update by conditionalization.

We note that strict propriety follows from weak propriety, given truth-directedness, thus closing an argumentative gap in the literature.

This argues that evidence gathering is epistemically irrational for the (Buchak-style) risk-avoidant agent. To do this we consider how accuracy should be measured once risk-awareness is rationally permissible.

This studies epistemic versions of the liar paradox and suggests imprecise probabilities are rationally required in such cases.

How do accuracy-considerations apply in settings such as risk-aware decision theories, non-classical logic, imprecise probabilities?