I work on logic and formal epistemology, and often on the connection between these. Much of my work centres on epistemic versions of the liar paradox in the form of cases where one's credences undermine themselves. I also work on accuracy theory and alternative models of belief.
Lecturer in Philosophy, 2016–
Stipendary Research Fellow, 2015–16
Dr.Phil. (PhD) in Philosophy, 2016
Master in Mathematics and Philosophy, 2012
My current projects…
We argue that accuracy-theoretic considerations still tell the risk-sensitive to update by conditionalization.
We show that Moss's model of uncertainty is at least as expressively powerful as every other current imprecise probability framework. And we give a Dutch Book argument for certain failures of consistency.
We note that strict propriety follows from weak propriety, given truth-directedness, thus closing an argumentative gap in the literature.