Accurate Updating for the Risk-Sensitive

We argue that accuracy-theoretic considerations still tell the risk-sensitive to update by conditionalization.

Strict Propriety is Weak

We note that strict propriety follows from weak propriety, given truth-directedness, thus closing an argumentative gap in the literature.

Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence

This argues that evidence gathering is epistemically irrational for the (Buchak-style) risk-avoidant agent. To do this we consider how accuracy should be measured once risk-awareness is rationally permissible.

Believing Probabilistic Contents

We show that Moss’s model of uncertainty is at least as expressively powerful as every other current imprecise probability framework. And we give a Dutch Book argument for certain failures of consistency.

Probability for the Revision Theory of Truth

We investigate how to assign semantic probability values to sentences by tracking how often a sentence is true in transfinite sequences; particularly sequences from Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth.

Limits in the Revision Theory. More Than Just Definite Verdicts

This provides a new proposal for what to do at limit stages of the revision theory of truth: one shouldn’t only consider definite verdicts that are brought about, but more general closed properties. This is important if one wishes to consider a revision theory for probability.

Self-Referential Probability

This thesis discusses self-referential probabilities in some gory detail. We discuss a number of semantics models and initial work on how rationality considerations should apply in such cases.

Rational Probabilistic Incoherence. A Reply to Michael Caie

In addition to specific responses to Caie’s paper, this presents some bullets that need to be bitten if one adopts a consequentialist view of epistemic utility. Further such bullets are also presented in my thesis (ch.7)

How to Express Self-Referential Probability. A Kripkean Proposal

This presents a Kripke-style construction for a language with self-referential probability as well as an ω-complete axiomatisation. It also follows Stern in arguing that principles like introspection should be formulated using a truth predicate.

See drafts