We argue that accuracy-theoretic considerations still tell the risk-sensitive to update by conditionalization.
We note that strict propriety follows from weak propriety, given truth-directedness, thus closing an argumentative gap in the literature.
This argues that evidence gathering is epistemically irrational for the (Buchak-style) risk-avoidant agent. To do this we consider how accuracy should be measured once risk-awareness is rationally permissible.
This thesis discusses self-referential probabilities in some gory detail. We discuss a number of semantics models and initial work on how rationality considerations should apply in such cases.
In addition to specific responses to Caie’s paper, this presents some bullets that need to be bitten if one adopts a consequentialist view of epistemic utility. Further such bullets are also presented in my thesis (ch.7)
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We argue that the model of probabilities needs revising when non-classical logics are considered. For strong-Kleene logic we suggest a belief-pair, and for supervaluational logic adopt imprecise probability.
What do measures of accuracy which are risk-weightedly strictly-proper look like? Some results.
We suggest that accuracy considerations should apply to the imprecise by using: what a set recommends is the set of what the individuals in it recommend. This results in a surprisingly nice picture of accuracy for the imprecise.