Kripkean fixed-points

Seeming dilemmas arise when what you believe affects what you should believe. I propose that in such cases, rationality mandates indetermiante epistemic states.

We investigate the supervaluational Kripkean account of truth and show how it can apply to finding rational indeterminate credences in undermining scenarios. Our construction is general and could apply to a whole range of domains.

This thesis discusses self-referential probabilities in some gory detail. We discuss a number of semantics models and initial work on how rationality considerations should apply in such cases.

This presents a Kripke-style construction for a language with self-referential probability as well as an ω-complete axiomatisation. It also follows Stern in arguing that principles like introspection should be formulated using a truth predicate.

We show that Bacon’s conditional is in fact equivalent to a simple strict conditional in a converse well-founded frame.