We investigate the supervaluational Kripkean account of truth and show how it can apply to finding rational indeterminate credences in undermining scenarios.
This provides a new proposal for what to do at limit stages of the revision theory of truth: one shouldn’t only consider definite verdicts that are brought about, but more general closed properties. This is important if one wishes to consider a revision theory for probability.
This thesis discusses self-referential probabilities in some gory detail. We discuss a number of semantics models and initial work on how rationality considerations should apply in such cases.
In addition to specific responses to Caie’s paper, this presents some bullets that need to be bitten if one adopts a consequentialist view of epistemic utility. Further such bullets are also presented in my thesis (ch.7)
This presents a Kripke-style construction for a language with self-referential probability as well as an ω-complete axiomatisation. It also follows Stern in arguing that principles like introspection should be formulated using a truth predicate.
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We suggest that accuracy considerations should apply to the imprecise by using: what a set recommends is the set of what the individuals in it recommend. This results in a surprisingly nice picture of accuracy for the imprecise.